As the 90's closed, Apple began unlocking the same direct sales efficiencies Dell had pioneered in the 90’s. Direct sales to consumers using the web allowed Apple to defend itself from lost Mac sales through retailers who were increasingly disinterested in selling Apple’s products.
However, by selling direct like Dell, Apple could turn the tables on disinterested retailers and earn both manufacturing profits and retail profits.
Direct sales also gave Apple the opportunity to introduce a consistent and strong retail presence of its own, rather than being represented only by a loose collective of third party resellers.
The Art of Balance
Unlike Dell, Apple relied on existing channel partners to sell most of its computers; by shifting toward direct sales, Apple risked the ire of retailers and dealerships, who obviously didn't want to compete with Apple for Mac sales, particularly on the high end where the greatest retail profits were.
Apple had to balance a sensitive line. It couldn't afford to just helplessly watch while its various resellers casually sold the Mac haphazardly, as it suited them, without following any overall or consistent strategy. At the same time, Apple couldn't afford to jump into the role of Dell and abandon its retail partners, independent dealers, and other mail order operations.
The success of the online Apple Store proved that existing sales channels weren't aggressively selling as many Macs as Apple could itself. While maintaining its partnerships within other retail stores and with dealers, Apple increasingly found it needed to find a way to drive its own retail efforts.
Starting a Retail Strategy
Things did not look good.
Averting Predicted Failure
When Apple first announced plans to open its own retail stores, there was no shortage of analysts offering to explain why its efforts were going to fail.
"It makes absolutely no sense whatsoever for them to open retail stores."
Goldstein complained that Apple's retail strategy wasn't going to work because consumers 'haven't indicated that they're having trouble finding outlets that sell Macs,' stating that "It's another case of Apple being Jobs driven and not consumer driven."
"I give them two years before they're turning out the lights on a very painful and expensive mistake."
To be fair, Goldstein was an analyst with a Dallas-based “growth-strategy consulting firm.” Given the growth strategy available in Dallas, Texas, very little could be expected from him; he might as well have been a Manhattan barnyard analyst.
They are all too eager to serve as the ready mouthpiece for any analyst, consultant, or other self appointed expert, without any regard for their credibility, background, or track record, as long as they’re able to contribute a quotable viewpoint.
Even worse, their opinions are rarely interesting or insightful, as the main goal is to offer sensationalist, but forgettable, opinions that generate them short term blips of notoriety, but which are forgotten about long before anyone can add up their track record of an inability to predict anything.
Weathering a Post-Dotcom Collapse
Goldstein's remarks were neither bold nor controversial in 2001. Retail was in decline and the economy in general was tanking. Goldstein, Edwards and others all likely thought they were shooting fish in a barrel by panning Apple’s retail efforts.
The dotcom euphoria that had driven tech sales, including Apple's, had been replaced with a morosely bleak outlook for the future. The American Supreme Court had just overturned a democratic election, and had instead installed a cokehead failure tied to war interests as the country’s chief executive.
Other computer retailers were already in deep trouble. Gateway was reeling, and had begun closing its worst performing stores; many department stores had begun to back out of PC sales entirely; Apple dealers were similarly struggling with slack demand for new machines after the bubble burst.
Still, there was also the realization--even among some of Apple's own dealers--that without direct retail orchestrated by Apple, the Mac platform was never going to grow.
The Myth of Too Many Stores
Conventional wisdom suggested that, given the finite demand for new Macs, direct retail sales by Apple would come entirely at the expense of its retail partners and dealer network.
This expectation was voiced by many of Apple's dealers, who sat on the constrained supply line between Apple and some of its most valuable customers. Groups of Apple dealers eventually launched lawsuits accusing Apple of fraud, breach of contract, false advertising, and unfair competition.
It turned out that McNeill was right. While more Mac retail stores might initially divide up the existing demand, in the long term Apple's retail stores would expand the Mac market and like a rising tide, lift all boats.
Apple dealers and retailers who survived the shift found increased business from the growing Mac user base, and opportunities to partner with Apple’s new stores to handle overflow business that didn’t fit within Apple’s sights.
The Second Success Factor
Despite getting started during an unfavorable retail climate and the struggle to balance direct retail with its resale partners, Apple's efforts were richly rewarded and had a major impact on its subsequent growth, profitability, platform viability, and customer satisfaction.
Next Article: Why Apple's Retail Worked
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